Longer-Term Consequences of Anger Expression in Negotiation: Retali...

Gerben A. Van Kleef 

University of Amsterdam - Department of Psychology

Carsten K. W. De Dreu 

University of Amsterdam - Department of Psychology

Abstract:      
Negotiators often concede to angry partners. But what happens when they meet again? The reputation spill-over hypothesis predicts that negotiators demand less from a partner who had expressed anger during a previous negotiation, because they perceive the other as tough. The retaliation hypothesis posits that negotiators demand more from a partner who had previously expressed anger, because they develop a negative impression of the other and want to set things straight. In Experiment 1, participants first negotiated with a simulated partner who expressed anger during a computer-mediated negotiation. Participants subsequently demanded less in a second negotiation when they dealt with the same rather than a different partner. In Experiment 2, participants demanded less in the second negotiation when their partner in the first negotiation had expressed anger rather than no emotion and the second negotiation was with the same (rather than a different) partner. Consistent with the spill-over hypothesis, this effect was mediated by inferences regarding the partner's limits.

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